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Immigration Enforcement and Crime: 
Evidence from the 287(g) and Secure Communities Programs 
 
Abstract  
The primary question of this analysis is whether policies that create a streamlined 
deportation process for unauthorized immigrant offenders decrease crime rates. Using the 
policy variations of Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the 
Secure Communities program, I estimate the effect of immigration policy enforcement on 
crime rates using a difference-in-difference strategy. The results are congruent with 
previous immigration enforcement literature estimating that neither program had a 
meaningful effect on crime rates. While there is no strong evidence pointing to negative 
effects of the programs on crime, certain specifications and subsamples analyzed in this 
paper show that the 287(g) program may be associated with an increase in crime. I 
suggest that this effect may be driven by changes in crime detection and recommend 
replication with more precise crime and victimization data to strengthen the estimates and 




An extensive body of research studies the impact of immigration on America’s labor 
markets, political composition and social dynamics. For decades researchers have been 
asking how immigrants differ from natives and what impact they have on the fabric of 
American life. One fundamental concern is that immigrants may bring crime to American 
cities, straining law enforcement agencies and making communities more dangerous 
across the nation.  
 Much of the United States’ current immigration enforcement policy is grounded in 
the concern that opening our borders threatens the safety of native communities. With the 
creation of the Department for Homeland Security, following the 9/11 attacks, politicians 
and legislators alike have become more vigilant to the threat of outsiders breaching 
American borders. Recent legislation has further built upon this belief, increasingly 
honing in on criminality as a basis for immigration regulations and using deportation as a 
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tool to remove the most dangerous immigrants by force. 
 This paper serves to shed light on one central question: do our current immigration 
enforcement policies that target unauthorized immigrant offenders achieve their central 
goal of reducing crime in American neighborhoods? Through a difference-in-difference 
approach, I will analyze the effect of Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
and the Secure Communities program on crime rates in order to assess the efficacy of 
deportation-focused policies. This question is at the heart of current immigration policy 
debate and is crucial for ensuring that the government implements productive and 
efficient policy.  
 
The Relationship Between Immigration and Crime 
According to a classical labor economic framework known as the Roy Model, immigrants 
who are unskilled see positive returns to migration and are thus incentivized to come to 
the U.S. (Heckman and Honore, 1990). This phenomenon is known as “negative 
selection” where the poorest, least educated foreign-born individuals migrate to the U.S. 
seeking opportunity. As a result, much of the immigrant population is associated with 
high levels of poverty and low levels of education, characteristics that are often strongly 
linked to criminal activity. Further weight is given by Shaw and McKay’s (1942) theory 
of “social disorganization” that describes how the propensity for crime increases with the 
breakdown of social organization. Such disorganization, the authors explain, is 
characterized by residential mobility, high levels of poverty and ethnic heterogeneity, all 
factors that occur with increased immigration. Similarly, Strain Theory, introduced by 
sociologist Robert K. Merton in 1938, explains how the societal pressures of achieving 
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the American dream matched with a lack of resources leads to a strain in which 
immigrants are more likely to commit crimes to realize their goals. Each of these 
theoretical models supports the idea that immigrant populations have higher crime rates 
than their native counterparts. 
While fear of immigrant crime is widespread, research has shown that immigrants 
do not commit proportionally more (and maybe even fewer) crimes than natives. Using 
FBI Uniform Crime Report data, Butcher and Piehl (1998) found that immigration flows 
have no effect on crime rates and that youth born abroad are in fact less likely to commit 
crimes than native-born youth. Using cross-sectional variations, Adelman, Reid and 
Markle (2016) reaffirmed this finding by examining crime rates from 200 metropolitan 
areas and the density of their immigrant populations over a forty-year period (1970-2010). 
After controlling for a series of neighborhood characteristics, they found that areas with a 
higher share of immigrants had lower rates of violent and property crime. 
Following the Mariel boatlift, a mass immigration of Cubans onto the shores of 
Miami in 1980, discussion over Hispanic immigration came to the forefront of policy 
debate. The influx of 125,000 immigrants onto American soil within just seven months 
presented substantial research opportunities for the study of immigration. Ramiro 
Martinez Jr. and Jacob I. Stowell (2012) evaluated the effect of immigration on two 
dominantly Latino cities: San Antonio, Texas and Miami, Florida. While San Antonio did 
not see the sudden influx of immigrants that Miami did in the eighties, it is known for its 
steady flow of Mexican immigrants given its proximity to the southern border. The 
authors found that with the increase in immigration between 1980 and 1990, homicide 
and drug-related homicide in both cities decreased. Martinez and Stowell (2012) 
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generalized this research by running regressions on 1,000 “new destination” counties in 
the year 2000. Their results echoed what they found in Miami and San Antonio, 
reiterating the negative correlation between immigration and homicide rates. 
Despite low crime rates in areas with recent flows of immigrants, research 
shows that immigrants are disproportionally represented in correctional facilities. John 
Hagan and Alberto Palloni (1999) investigated this phenomenon in two U.S. border cities, 
El Paso and San Diego and attributed this over- representation to biases in the length and 
conditions of pre-trial detention and the corresponding effects on conviction and 
sentencing. The authors concluded that immigrant incarceration exaggerates the 
immigrant crime rate between three and seven percent. 
Butcher and Piehl (2005) suggest that the discrepancy in crime rates between 
immigrants and natives is due to the self-selection of individuals who choose to migrate 
(quite in contrary to some theoretical models). They conclude that these individuals either 
have lower criminal propensity or are more responsive to the deterrent effects of 
criminality than the average native, making them inherently less likely to commit crimes. 
 
Institutional Background 
Despite empirical evidence that suggests otherwise, American policy discussions have 
long surrounded the belief that strict immigration enforcement is directly linked to the 
safety of 
American cities. As a result, a series of bills have been passed in recent years to ensure 
that the United States prioritizes the removal of unauthorized immigrants with a specific 
focus on immigrant offenders. Unlike U.S. citizen criminal offenders who are placed 
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through the criminal justice system upon conviction, unauthorized immigrant offenders 
can be deported and do not have the right to stay in the country upon conviction. This 
allows the federal government to simply remove undesirable individuals if they lack 
sufficient legal documentation.  
The United States has a long history of using quota systems to ensure only the 
most desirable immigrants are granted entry. After the Great Depression and World War 
II, a global halt in migration began to harm the U.S. labor market. To rectify this, the 
government created the Bracero program in 1942. In order to fill the cheap labor pools, 
the government sponsored the entry of Mexican immigrants to fill secondary sector jobs 
that natives refused to work. This created a precedent for Mexican migration that has 
sparked much of the debate over immigration in the U.S. Currently, over 11 million 
unauthorized immigrants reside within U.S. borders, many of whom work in the 
agriculture, manufacturing and construction industries, often living in extreme poverty 
due to low wages. As the unauthorized population has grown, the government has 
become increasingly concerned about their effects on native society.   
Over the past century, the U.S. government has crafted extensive screening 
systems and visa programs attempting to keep out the “bad” immigrants and allow in the 
“good” ones (Migration Policy Institute). In practice, it is very difficult to ensure that 
those who cross the border both legally and illegally are not bringing crime to their 
destination cities. Due to a lack of successful border enforcement and the large 
unauthorized immigrant population currently residing in the U.S., the government has 
shifted towards retroactive policies aimed at the removal of the “bad” immigrants. 
Known as the largest crime bill in the history of the United States, The Violent 
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Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (HR 3355, P.L. 103-322) created an explicit 
legislative connection between immigration and crime. The bill, passed by Congress in 
1994, authorized $1.2 billion in federal resources to increase border control, prioritize the 
deportation of criminal immigrants and help states jail criminal unauthorized immigrants. 
This federal support set the stage for a campaign against unauthorized criminal offenders.  
 
Focal Programs: Secure Communities and 287(g) 
With the Bush administration came a new series of bills to address immigration and 
crime. 
Piloted in 2008, Secure Communities streamlined the process of deporting unauthorized 
criminal offenders by creating a partnership between federal and local correctional 
facilities. Upon receiving a criminal suspect, local law enforcement agencies run 
fingerprints that are sent to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to verify the 
suspect’s immigration status. If they are found to be unauthorized, ICE may place a 
“detainer” on them, requesting that the local jail hold the suspect for 48 hours beyond the 
scheduled release date. This gives ICE the chance to obtain custody of the suspect and 
begin deportation proceedings. This program was implemented between the years 2008 
and 2013 and has now been universally adopted in every county in the United States.  
Targeting the same population from a slightly different angle, Section 287(g) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)) created federal-local law 
enforcement partnerships to improve the efficiency of deportation of criminal immigrants. 
The 287(g) program allowed for the Department of Homeland Security to train state and 
local authorities to identify, process and detain criminal immigrants. This partnership 
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deputizes local police to work as immigration authority, using their newfound power to 
identify and detain unauthorized individuals without the involvement of federal agencies. 
Under the program, 287(g) officers are given the power to check DHS databases for 
immigration status information, interview immigrants to ascertain their status, issue ICE 
detainers, place immigration charges to initiate formal removal proceedings and transfer 
unauthorized immigrants into ICE custody. The basic program has three models: jail 
enforcement, task force and hybrid. The jail enforcement model allows officers to inquire into 
immigration status and act upon their findings once an individual is brought to the local jail. 
The task force model deputizes officers to inquire into immigration status in the field, to issue 
arrest warrants for immigration violations and execute search warrants. The hybrid model is a 
combination of the jail enforcement and task force model, where officers within local jails 
work closely with officers in the field to identify and detain unauthorized criminal offenders.  
Under the 287(g) program, ICE has agreements with 60 law enforcement 
agencies in 18 states, and according to DHS, has identified over 402,000 “removable 
aliens”. In a memo to ICE federal officials in February 2017, DHS reiterated the 
importance of 287(g) deputized law enforcement presence at local jails to prioritize the 
removal of criminal immigrants. 
 
Effects of Deportation Policies 
While there is substantial research on the negative link between immigration and crime, U.S. 
policies continue to target criminal immigrants. In an era of new political leadership many are 
looking to the government to shape the future of immigration policy. The Trump administration 
has been explicit in its efforts to reinforce legislation that target unauthorized criminals through 
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the restoration and revitalization of deportation policies. As promised, on January 25 2017, 
President Trump signed the “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States” 
executive order, which revitalized both Secure Communities and the 287(g) programs. 
This revitalization raises an important question about whether the targeting and 
deportation of unauthorized immigrants who commit crimes actually reduces crime rates. 
Both  287(g) and Secure Communities have come at a high cost. Under 287(g), detainees 
were held for an average of 81 days, with a cost of $60 per day, incurring an average cost per 
individual detention of $5,000. Between the years 2006 and 2016, the federal government 
allocated over $460 million to the program. Similarly, data from Los Angeles County shows 
that Secure Communities costs the county over $26 million annually, due to the high costs of 
holding suspects in local jails on immigration detainers at ICE’s request. Across the nation 
these programs prove to be extraordinarily costly.  
Determining the efficacy of these policies in attaining their goals is therefore 
essential. While evidence on the link between immigration and crime reported earlier 
suggests that deporting immigrant offenders may not be the most efficient way to reduce 
crime rates, it is possible that it will have an impact nonetheless. Given that, on average, 
unauthorized immigrants commit fewer crimes than natives, deporting the most egregious 
offenders may in fact reduce crime rates. Despite their magnitude, few empiricists have 
focused on the effects of these deportation-focused policies. An exception is Miles and Cox 
(2014), who evaluated the effect of the Secure Communities program across more than 3,000 
U.S. counties. They found that it had no meaningful effect on the FBI index crime rate nor 
did it reduce violent crime rates. Their analysis is evidence against the belief that deporting 
criminal immigrants makes our cities, neighborhoods and communities safer. This paper 
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serves to expand upon their research and determine whether their findings can be generalized 
to other similar immigration enforcement programs.  
While Miles and Cox (2014) present a thorough analysis of the Secure 
Communities program’s effect of crime rates, this paper will explore some aspects that their 
model did not account for. While Secure Communities was implemented in selected counties 
across the nation and presents an opportunity for a difference-in-difference analysis, its 
implementation overlapped heavily with the Great Recession, which has been shown to be 
associated with trends in crime (Uggen, 2012), likely biasing Miles and Cox’s estimates 
downward. Additionally, the Secure Communities program was rolled out in a non-random 
pattern, targeting states closer to the border first and inland states only later. This paper will 
examine a similar question to the one Miles and Cox evaluate but from a different 
perspective and with the introduction of the 287(g) program as an important policy treatment 
in itself. 
Despite the fact that the program was not implemented on a national level, 
including the 287(g) program in this analysis has advantages over analyzing only Secure 
Communities. In contrast to Secure Communities, the 287(g) program presents an 
opportunity to reduce the selection bias in that there were counties that applied for the 
program and were rejected. It is harder to argue that counties that implemented 287(g) 
partnerships were substantively different from those that did not because it is likely that 
most counties that applied had baseline commonalities.  Including precise 287(g) data 
may yield a more precise and accurate estimate of the effect of deportation policy on 
crime rates. 
The primary question of this analysis is whether deportation-focused immigration 
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policies decrease crime rates. As the explicit goal of both Secure Communities and the 
287(g) program was to decrease crime, one would expect that if these program were to be 
effective, crime rates in counties with Secure Communities and 287(g) partnerships 
should decrease at a faster rate than those that did not implement the programs (or 
implemented them at a later date). Despite the fact that immigrants commit crimes at a 
lower rate than natives, presumably removing those who do commit crimes would still 
decrease crime rates overall. Following this logic, counties that went into Secure 
Communities and 287(g) partnerships with the Department of Homeland Security should 
see more of a reduction in crime rates than similar counties that did not.   
 
Data and Empirical Strategy  
Policy and Outcome Measures 
To evaluate the effect of immigration enforcement policy on crime, I have assembled a 
panel dataset from a variety of sources. For each county-year observation the data include 
crime statistics, demographic information and variables indicating whether the 287(g) 
and Secure Communities programs were implemented at that point in time. The data span 
from the year 2004 to 2012. The time frame begins with 2004 to allow ample time before 
the programs were implemented and terminates with the latest publicly available crime 
data in 2012. 
Annual county crime measures come from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports. 
Crimes reported include property crimes (burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft and 
arson) and violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault) recorded for 
each county each year. These data are made publicly available by the FBI and accessed 
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through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the 
University of Michigan.  
The independent variables in my analysis are whether a county has implemented 
a 287(g) partnership or Secure Communities program (or both). Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) released 287(g) data through a series of Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) requests obtained by Matthew Hall of Cornell University. These 
data include both a binary variable indicating whether an agreement is activated in a 
given county and year as well as counts of persons identified for removal by ICE and 
those who were detained through the program. The majority of agreements were through 
county sheriff’s offices, although several were enacted on the municipal level (at which 
point the implementation status was applied to the whole county). These data also include 
an indicator for whether a given county borders a county that implemented 278(g). This 
variable was added to the panel file in order to control for spillover effects of the program 
and is used in the model as a covariate.  
Additionally, FOIA requests include information on counties that submitted an 
application to enter into a 287(g) partnership but withdrew or were rejected by the 
Department of Homeland Security. These observations are essential for my analysis as 
they serve as a control group to compare the treated counties to. A primary concern in 
any treatment model is that the counties that were treated are fundamentally different 
from those that were not treated, causing bias in the model. The theory behind this choice 
of control group is that it eliminates much of this bias. We can assume that counties that 
applied for the program and were rejected are in fact more similar to the treated counties 
than those that did not apply at all on a variety of unobservable characteristics. Using this 
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control group strengthens the robustness of our model. Information on the reason for 
rejection was not included, but media reports suggest it is likely due to lack of county 
resources to implement the program effectively.  
Secure Communities data come from the Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement division of the Department of Homeland Security. Data were obtained 
through Catalina Amuedo-Doranrtes of the Department of Economics at San Diego State 
University. Overall, adoption of Secure Communities was at the county level, yet some 
state corrections departments or sheriff’s offices adopted the policy on their own. These 
non-county adoptions were dropped from the panel data set. The ICE data provides 
specific dates of adoption for each county in the United States.  
To account for differences between counties, demographic data was added to 
the panel file. Demographic data was obtained from the Census Bureau (largely from the 
2000 decennial Census and the American Community Survey) and includes information 
on racial composition, median household income, annual population counts, 
unemployment rates and industry employment information. One central variable to this 
analysis is the estimate of the unauthorized immigrant population in each county. These 
data were compiled based on the data fusion approach developed in Capps et. al (2013) 
(see Rugh and Hall 2016). (These data are only available for the large counties (about 
two thirds of the total sample). Primary analyzes were rerun to ensure that this sampling 
did not bias the estimates and results were identical to the estimates presented in the 
paper.) The total core sample consists of 3,163 counties across 9 years, yielding a sample 
size of 28,740.  
Tables 1 through 4 show characteristics of all the counties in the United States 
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broken down by program treatment for both 287(g) and Secure Communities. Tables 1 
and 2 show that counties that were approved for the 287(g) partnership were on average 
larger, had more foreign born residents, more Hispanics, a greater proportion of 
unauthorized immigrants, lower unemployment rates, higher median household income 
and higher crime rates than other counties in the dataset. This suggests that 287(g) 
treatment was not randomly assigned, and we must therefore be cautious in assigning a 
causal interpretation to the results presented below. While most characteristics in the 
demographic panel file are more similar between the approved and never-applied 
counties, White-Hispanic dissimilarity, unemployment rate and median household 
income are more similar in approved and denied counties. These variables may in fact be 
more potent predictors of crime as income-related struggles and racial tensions have been 
shown in the literature to be highly associated with crime (Maume et al. 2010). 
The final row of Table 2 estimates the predicted value of log crime rates based 
on the covariates outlined in Table 1. These results suggest that the never-applied and 
approved counties are overall observably more similar to each other than the approved 
and denied counties. While these estimates suggest that the never-applied counties may 
serve as a stronger control group based on observables, there could be many 
unobservable characteristics such as policing practices and political affiliations that 
impact crime rates that would likely be more similar for counties that applied for the 
287(g) program. Given that these characteristics are difficult to detect in standard 
demographic data, I will report results from both the broad sample of all counties in the 
United States and the subsample of only counties that applied for a 287(g) partnership 
throughout the analysis.  
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Table 4 shows that counties that adopted Secure Communities prior to 2011 
were similarly distinct from counties that adopted the program later on the same set of 
characteristics. These differences are to be expected, as the DHS was responsive to 
counties that were eager to implement immigration policy. 
 
Empirical Model Specification 
The first stage of my analysis leverages variation in timing and location of 287(g) 
agreements to assess the effect of deportation-focused immigration policy on crime rates. 
The estimating equation takes the form:     
lnCit = Activate(SC)itδ +Activate(287)itΓ+ Xitβ + αi + αt + εit,   
 (1) 
 
where lnCit is the natural log of the crime rate in county i at calendar year t. The term 
Activate(SC)it is a binary variable indicating whether Secure Communities was adopted 
and Activate(287)it  is a binary variable representing whether a 287(g) partnership was 
implemented (applied and accepted) in county i on date t.  Xit represents the demographic 
covariates discussed above including total and unauthorized populations, racial 
composition, employment statistics, income information and whether the county bordered 
a 287(g) county. The control group used for the 287(g) analysis is the set of counties that 
applied for a 287(g) partnership and were rejected, while for Secure Communities the 
early adopter counties serve as a control group for the later adopter counties. αi and αt are 
county and year fixed effects and the εit term represents the error in the regression. tδ and 
Γ measure the effects of the agreements on crime in the baseline model of (1).  
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 The second stage of my analysis includes an interaction term between the 
two programs to assess the effect of both Secure Communities and 287(g) being in 
implemented in a county. This equation mirrors the first in form, but includes the 
interaction term. The basic model is as follows: 
 
lnCit = Activate(SC)itδ +Activate(287)itΓ+Activate(SC+287)itθ+ Xitβ + αi + αt + 
εit, (2) 
 
where Activate(SC+287)itθ yields the effect of both programs being in place 
simultaneously in county i at date t and all other variables remain the same. This 
regression allows me to evaluate the difference in crime trends for counties that 
implemented one or both of the programs. In the third stage of the analysis I analyze 
various subgroups in order to gauge the heterogeneity in the effects of the programs on 
crime. All regressions are weighted by the county population and standard errors are 
clustered at the state-level.  
 
Results  
Estimates of Total Index Crime Rate 
Panel A of Table 5 reports initial difference-in-difference estimates for the log of total 
index crime rates for both Secure Communities and 287(g). Regression Specification A 
column 1 shows a simple difference-in-difference estimate indicating that Secure 
Communities decreased crime by 3.24% while 287(g) increased crime by 4.92%. These 
coefficients are significant at the 90% level and suggest that the programs may be having 
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a small impact on crime rates. The estimate of the effect of Secure Communities is very 
similar Miles and Cox’s baseline finding of a 4% reduction in crime due to the program’s 
implementation. As we would expect these programs to decrease crime rates, the positive 
sign on the 287(g) coefficient in this regression is particularly surprising.  
 While 287(g) was only implemented in a select set of counties across the 
nation, by the year 2013 Secure Communities was universally implemented across every 
county in the United States. This means that all counties with 287(g) also saw the 
introduction of Secure Communities before 2013. While I am interested in the effect of 
both programs individually, here I investigate the effect of having both programs in place 
simultaneously. While we might expect that an increase in enforcement of immigration 
policy would have diminishing marginal returns, the estimates on the program interaction 
variables suggest otherwise.  
 Regression 2 includes a program interaction variable that looks at the effect of 
having both Secure Communities and 287(g) in place simultaneously in a given county 
and year. For all regressions that include an interaction term, the coefficient on the 
interaction between the two programs tends to be negative (and statistically insignificant), 
suggesting that having the two programs in place may have increasing marginal returns in 
reducing crime. Table 5 Regression 2 shows that including the program interaction term 
drives the coefficient on the both programs down to nearly zero at -0.0073. This is a 
relatively similar estimate to Miles and Cox who found a .0025 baseline estimate when 
including county time trends in their regression.  
  Regression Specification B of Table 5 reports a subsample analysis of the 
effects of these programs. These regressions use a sample of only counties that applied 
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for a 287(g) partnership and leverages whether they were approved for the program by 
the Department of Homeland Security or not as the treatment. This subsample reduces 
selection bias in the model by comparing counties that were both interested in 
implementing the program. The first regression column shows the impact of the two 
programs on crime rates. Both coefficients are small in magnitude and not statistically 
significant suggesting that for this subsample the programs were largely ineffective. 
While the Secure Communities estimate does not change much from the previous 
regressions (-.0324 to -.0223), the 287(g) estimate drastically drops from .0492 to .0024. 
Using the denied counties as a control group allows us to better estimate the effect of the 
287(g) program by eliminating much of the selection bias in implementation. These 
estimates presented in Specification B serve as the most robust in this analysis and are the 
basis for concluding that neither program had substantial effects on crime rates.   
While I am interested in analyzing the effect of treatment for the subsample of 
counties that applied for 287(g) throughout the following regressions, given the small 
sample size, the standard errors remain large throughout and the results are therefore 
difficult to interpret. As such the following analyses will be conducted using the entire 
sample of counties. 
 
Estimates of Violent and Property Crime 
While immigration policy focuses on overall crime, much of the rhetoric about 
immigrants and crime hones in on violent offenses. Table 6 provides estimates for the 
effect of the two programs on violent and property crimes. For the most part, these 
estimates mirror the previous table’s estimates in sign and magnitude yet the 287(g) 
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estimates seem overall larger than for total index crime rates. For most regressions, the 
changes in violent crime rates were more substantial than that of property crime. 
Specifications A of Table 6 suggest that Secure Communities was effective at targeting 
violent offenders and slightly less effective when it came to property crime. In contrast, 
287(g) generated large increases in violent crime rates while having little effect on 
property crime. Including the program interaction variable suggests that the two programs 
together reduced violent crime by 3% but increased property crime by 0.42%, a number 
so small in magnitude that we can argue there was no substantial effect.  
 The estimates on violent and property crime rates converge more in the 
sample of counties that applied for 287(g) partnerships. For these counties, the two 
programs in unison caused a 9.2% reduction in violent crime and a 4.27% reduction in 
property crime. While most of these estimates are not statistically significant their 
magnitude suggests that the programs may have a strong impact on crime rates when 
combined.  
 
Subsample Analyses: Unauthorized Population and Adoption Timing 
Programs like 287(g) and Secure Communities rely on a substantial population of 
unauthorized immigrants in order to have an effect on crime reduction. If an individual is 
arrested and does have legal documentation status the authorities running the programs 
have no authority to detain him/her on the grounds of immigration status. We might 
expect that counties with high levels of unauthorized immigrants are already more 
vigilant to issues of immigration and might initially have higher levels of ICE 
involvement with local authorities. It follows that they would be more prepared to 
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implement Secure Communities and 287(g) and might therefore see more significant 
returns to the programs as a result of their efficiency and vigilance. Table 7 examines the 
differences in how effective the programs were at reducing crime in counties with high 
proportions of unauthorized immigrants relative to those with low proportions.  
 Table 7 differentiates between counties that were above and below the 
median of the fraction of the population of unauthorized immigrants. Estimates for 
Secure Communities, 287(g) and the interaction between the programs are larger in 
magnitude for counties below the median than those above. This suggests that the 
programs had larger impacts in counties with lower unauthorized immigrant populations, 
counter to my hypothesis. For counties with low unauthorized counts, Secure 
Communities decreased crime by 3.54% while 287(g) increased crime by 9.58% and the 
two programs together combined for an increase in crime by 7.54%. In contrast, counties 
above the median saw very limited effects. For such counties, Secure Communities 
decreased crime by 2.37% and 287(g) increased crime by 2.39%. These estimates show 
that the programs were much stronger in counties with low levels of unauthorized 
immigrants and that these effects overall increased crime1.  
 The second subsample analysis distinguishes between counties that 
implemented Secure Communities prior to 2011 (the median implementation year) and 
those that implemented it after 2011. While Secure Communities was enforced 
throughout the nation by 2013, the rollout of the program was staggered, with some 
counties adopting it as early as 2008 and others as late as 2013.  It is possible that early 
                                                        
1 Unauthorized counts are only available for large counties resulting in approximately 2/3 of U.S. counties 
being dropped in this analysis. The main regressions in Table 5 were replicated with this subsample to 
ensure that the remaining counties were representative of the broad sample and the coefficients yielded 
were identical to those presented in Table 5.  
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adopter counties were different from late adopter counties on many dimensions. For 
example, it’s possible that the counties that adopted Secure Communities prior to 2011 
were more eager to implement immigration enforcement policy and were therefore more 
prepared to put such a program in place. Therefore we might expect that early adopter 
counties would see a greater reduction in crime from both Secure Communities and 
287(g).  
 These estimates show, however, that the late adopter counties experienced 
much stronger effects due the programs. Table 8 shows the impact of the programs on 
early and late adopter counties on three dimensions: total index crime rate, violent crime 
rate and property crime rate. Following the trend of previous estimates Secure 
Communities minimally reduced crime while 287(g) minimally increased crime in early 
adopter counties. In contrast, the magnitude of the estimates for late adopter counties is 
substantially larger. At most, Secure Communities reduced crime by 9.18% and 287(g) 
increased crime by 15%. The effects of both programs on total index crime rate, violent 
and property crime rate are significant for late adopter counties. It is possible that this 
effect is due to increased efficiency over time or economies of scale. As the programs get 
larger, the Department of Homeland Security perfects their training programs and 
materials and trains county sheriffs more effectively for 287(g) and improves the speed 
and efficiency of their technology and contact with local authorities for Secure 
Communities. Such changes in the programs could lead to a stronger effect over time, as 





Despite differences in the magnitudes of my estimates, the effect I find from Secure 
Communities is generally congruent with Miles and Cox’s findings that Secure 
Communities had no meaningful impact on total index crime rates. Using the sample of 
counties that applied for the 287(g) program, I highlight the null effects of 287(g) in 
reducing crime rates, suggesting that both programs did not achieve their central 
objective in reducing crime and making American communities safer. The estimates 
presented in this paper suggest that despite data limitations, my conclusions are in line 
with Miles and Cox’s findings and with access to similarly precise data the estimates 
would likely converge more in magnitude.  
 While the main findings suggest that 287(g) was not associated with any 
significant changes in crime rates, the estimates of the effect of 287(g) on crime rates 
using the broad sample are almost all positive. This suggests that the program may have 
had an unusual and unanticipated effect. While Miles and Cox do incorporate 287(g) in 
their regressions and emphasize it as an important covariate, they choose not to explicitly 
report on its effects on crime rates. One major contribution of this paper is the focus on 
287(g) as an important policy variation and the significance of its interaction with the 
Secure Communities program.  
 In addition to focusing on the effects of 287(g), I was able to isolate a 
subsample that yields more precise causal estimates of the impact of the program. As 
287(g) functioned as an opt-in program, meaning that counties could voluntarily apply 
for the partnership, we can conclude that counties that opted in for 287(g) were 
fundamentally different from those that did not on a series of unobservable 
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characteristics. The type of county that would choose to implement an immigration 
enforcement policy is likely very different from one that does not choose to. While the 
basic demographics are similar between the never-applied and denied counties (see Table 
1), it is likely that the political atmosphere and the policing strategies converge more for 
counties that applied for the program. While these variables are largely unobservable, 
they are important and must be addressed to the best of our ability in order to estimate a 
causal treatment effect. Thus, the variation in approval status likely allows me to better 
isolate the effect of treatment into the 287(g) approved group more thoroughly, reducing 
the bias of the model. This subsample analysis provides opportunity for a more precise 
estimate of the effect of the 287(g) program than previously presented in the literature.  
 While Secure Communities has been shown to be ineffective at reducing 
crime, 287(g) seems to have increased crime in certain specifications. This may initially 
seem to indicate that because of the program, people commit more crimes. I would like to 
suggest otherwise. In looking at the differences in the institutional details between the 
two programs, it seems as though the discrepancy in efficacy may be due to their inherent 
differences in implementation. One possible explanation of the positive sign on the 
287(g) coefficients is as follows.  
 The 287(g) program functions by appointing and training officers in 
designated counties to serve as local immigration enforcement officers. Once approved 
for the program, local authorities select a candidate to attend the ICE training. Upon 
return, this individual is given the authority to check for immigration status and detain 
unauthorized offenders accordingly. In contrast, Secure Communities does not empower 
officers but rather implements a technology that enables local authorities to check for 
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immigration status by fingerprinting a suspect upon their arrival at the local jail.  In the 
case of 287(g), the empowerment of specific officers tasked with the obligation to reduce 
crime committed by immigrant offenders could incentivize officers to become more 
vigilant and active in their pursuit of criminal activity. As such, it is possible that the 
power and responsibility encourages these newly deputized officers to be more 
aggressive in their roles. This, in turn, could drive up the crime rates simply by having 
officers who are more effective in catching crime. Given that for Secure Communities, 
there is no individual increase in authority, it seems logical that such an effect would not 
be generated for this program. This narrative suggests that crime rates may in fact not be 
changing, but it is crime detection that is driving the magnitude and sign of the 287(g) 
coefficients found in this analysis.   
 In order to assess this claim I have analyzed several subsamples. While the 
effects of the programs on counties with high and low levels of unauthorized immigrants 
seemed initially surprising, with this narrative these findings fall more into line. As 
discussed previously, 287(g) seems to increase crime much more substantially for 
counties below the median of unauthorized immigrant population than for those above it. 
We can expect that if an officer becomes more vigilant and detects more crimes, some of 
those crimes would likely be committed by unauthorized immigrants. This should 
therefore reduce the crime rate as those offenders could be detained and eventually 
deported, ultimately reducing the number of criminals in the county. This could therefore 
mitigate the overall increase in crime rates due to detection, driving the effect closer to 
zero. However, if the county has very few unauthorized immigrants, the increase in crime 
detection will likely pick up very few unauthorized offenders (especially given the low 
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probability of criminal activity in the immigrant communities). Therefore, we would 
expect that crime should increase at a higher rate in counties with lower levels of 
unauthorized immigrants. This is in fact what we see, with a statistically significant effect 
of 9.58% on 287(g) in low unauthorized immigrant counties and a non-significant effect 
of 2.39% in counties with high levels of unauthorized immigrants.  
 Further, we might expect that this increase of crime detection would not have 
equivalent effects across various types of crimes. For example, it seems unlikely that 
these newly deputized officers will become more vigilant to high profile crimes such as 
murder and rape. With some faith in local authorities we can expect that these crimes 
were already being detected prior to the implementation of 287(g), and would therefore 
not expect the program to change such crime rates. In contrast, it seems logical that the 
new detections could be crimes that previously went under the radar, possibly more petty 
crimes such as larceny or burglary.  
 In order for this narrative to ring true, it seems as though violent crime rates 
must not see as large of an increase as property crime rates. For every subsample 
analyzed violent crime in fact increased at a higher rate than property crime, suggesting 
that this theory may be inaccurate. In order to analyze this question more 
comprehensively, I display results of the programs on specific crimes: murder, rape, 
robbery, aggravated assault (violent crimes) and burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft 
and arson (property crimes).  Tables 9 and 10 present these results. While more variation 
of the effect of 287(g) exists between specific crimes, the findings still are not fully 
congruent with this narrative. For example, it seems incomprehensible that detection of 
murder should increase by 10% after the implementation of this program but that 
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detection of burglary should only increase by 5%. Despite some evidence to suggest that 
the increase in crime rates due to 287(g) is due to better crime detection due to increased 
vigilance and action on the part of the officers, this narrative is not fully backed up by the 
findings outlined in this paper.  
 However, it is possible that rather than picking up hardened criminals, the 
287(g) program is instead identifying and detaining hard working, unauthorized 
individuals. If those being picked up by the program are in fact the breadwinners of local 
families it is possible that the program’s implementation tears families apart resulting in a 
breakdown in family structure and missing parents. This type of family breakdown is 
associated with many negative outcomes in the literature. In particular, parental 
separation is associated with poor child outcomes for minority children (Mackay, 2005). 
Additionally, Brabeck and Xu (2010) found that exposure to deportation is associated 
with individual’s concerns their about ability to provide financially for their families and 
negatively affects children’s school performance. Zinsmeister (1990) reports evidence 
that family breakdown is the most important source of violence by and among children. 
Tearing families apart through 287(g) may in fact be a mechanism for increasing crime. 
The program’s implementation is likely making families more desperate, resulting in 
more dangerous and crime-ridden neighborhoods.  
 In addition to carefully analyzing 287(g) estimates as well as Secure 
Communities, this paper also contributes to the existing literature by examining the effect 
of the two programs running in unison in a given county and year. Given that all 287(g) 
counties were also eventually counties that implemented Secure Communities, focusing 
on the interaction between the programs provides another layer of detail to estimating the 
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returns to immigration enforcement policy. While some interaction terms remain small, 
they range from close to zero to very large in magnitude. These estimates suggest that it 
may be important to consider the interaction between programs in order to fully 
understand the strength of immigration enforcement policy.  
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
In this stage of the analysis it is important to recall the data limitations and difficulties in 
identifying a causal treatment effect. The largest statistically significant effects of the 
287(g) program estimate around a 14% increase in index crime rates. The lack of 
precision in crime data and small sample size of 287(g) counties provide a limitation for 
identifying a causal effect. Miles and Cox’s model relies on including county-specific 
time trends in their regressions to control for exogenous changes in crime rates over time 
in a given county. This enhances their analysis quite dramatically by allowing for the 
counties to trend in a linear fashion over time. They are able to control for these trends 
because their UCR crime data is in monthly rather than annual form, giving them 
sufficient data before the treatment begins in order to capture county-specific trends. By 
including county-specific trends they are able to control for trends in specific counties 
that affect crime rates that are unrelated to the policy. Without using such trends, it is 
difficult to disentangle the causal effect of the policy from underlying crime trends in the 
county. Replication with more detailed UCR data would allow me to include county-
specific trends and would likely improve the analysis. Without the monthly UCR 
estimates, the results presented in this paper on Secure Communities deviate from Miles 
and Cox’s despite overall similarities in the conclusions drawn from the resulting 
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coefficients.  
 In regards to the precision of the 287(g) estimates, another concern for 
identifying causality arises. While the subsample analysis of only counties that applied 
for a 287(g) partnership is certainly an improvement on simply comparing treated 
counties to counties that didn’t apply for 287(g), this model is still likely biased. While 
data has not been released by ICE regarding why some counties were approved and 
others were denied for the program, it seems unlikely that the Department of Homeland 
Security’s selection was random. This suggests that counties that were approved were 
likely fundamentally different from those that applied, reducing our ability to claim a 
causal treatment effect.   
 In further exploring the effect of 287(g), I would be interested in 
distinguishing between different variants of the program and different degrees of 
implementation. Three subtypes of 287(g) were implemented: jail enforcement, task force 
and hybrid. These variants functioned slightly differently and it would be interesting to 
assess the effects of the different subtypes on crime rates in order to gain more insights 
into the mechanisms driving the effects. Evidence from the Migration Policy Institute 
suggests that the program’s implementation varied not only in 287(g) program type but in 
intensity as well. As 287(g) was not implemented in uniform form and intensity across 
counties, I would be interested in replicating this analysis but excluding notoriously 
tough-on-immigration counties such as Maricopa County, Arizona to determine whether 
these counties are driving the effects of the programs.   
While this analysis would be strengthened by including an event study analysis 
to determine the effects of the programs on crime rates over time, the relatively few data 
 29 
periods coupled with two sets of event dummy variables – one set for each program – 
result in the omission of key variables due to multicollinearity. As such, the event study 
was not included in this version of the paper. Future versions will be sure to include 
estimates of crime rates in the years before and after implementation to assess the 
strength of the baseline estimates over time. 
 While this paper does identify new strategies to identifying a causal 
impact, and recommends focusing on 287(g) as an important policy treatment, the 
analysis presented would also benefit from replication with more precise crime data. 
Given that it seems that crime detection rates may be playing a large role in the effects of 
these programs, I would recommend including data from the National Crime 
Victimization Survey. This survey consists of data from a nationally representative 
sample on victimization rates. Analyzing the discrepancy between victimization rates and 
rates of documented offenses may provide insight into changes in crime reporting and 
detection as a result of these immigration enforcement policies. Evidence from the 
Migration Policy Institute’s report on the effects of 287(g) suggests that in counties 
where 287(g) was implemented, immigrants were less likely to venture into public 
spaces, interact with the police, report crimes, interact with local schools and patronize 
local businesses. Using the NCVS data would allow us to analyze changes in crime 
detection and reporting, and determine whether FBI generated crime rates diverge from 
victimization reports with the implementation of 287(g) and Secure Communities. This 
would greatly enhance the analysis and would provide further evidence into the 
mechanisms through which these programs operate.
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Table 1. 
287(g) Summary Statistics 
 
Variable      Mean    Standard Deviation 
287(g) Agreement Enforcement 
 Activated?     .012         .110 
 Denied?     .677         .468 
 Identification*      742    1,758 
 Detainment*       702     1,266 
 
     Approved counties    Denied counties    Never-applied counties  
      n=54           n=113             n=3,179 
 
     Mean          SD         Mean         SD              Mean      SD 
 
County population (thousands)  3,494            3,541       573             374           847            1,021 
Fraction Foreign Born   .222         .101       .105            .057               .133            .113 
Fraction Hispanic   .293         .154       .096            .084               .143            .160 
Fraction Unauthorized Immigrant .085             .037       .033            .022           .039            .031 
White-Hispanic Dissimilarity   .596             .092       .625            .100            .694            .124 
Unemployment Rate    4.445           .948       4.67            1.152            5.500         1.827 
Median Household Income (dollars)    46,257        10,817       44,529         11,869            34,787        8,370 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
All demographic data are from the year 2000 (aside from unauthorized immigrant count which is extracted from the 2005 ACS) 




287(g) Outcome Variable Summary Statistics 
 
 
   Approved counties   Denied counties  Never-applied counties 
    n=54         n=113           n=3,179 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
            Mean       SD         Min   Max      Mean      SD       Min     Max        Mean      SD       Min     Max 
 
Crime count          33,937    57,797  466  377,855     8,032      10,602       0      73,527        2,651       8,946        0      211,649 
 
Crime rate (CR) *        4,082      1,582  908       8,518       3,342     1,489         0       8,317         3,736      1,657         0      14,918 
    
Violent CR*              485         282  45          1,655         362         234           0       1,182           395         277         0      2,578 
 
Property CR*             3,596      1,358         860       7,151         2,980       1,300         0       7,193        3,341      1,452         0      12,340 
 
Predicted log CR*ł      8.203       .325        7.407      9.010         8.019      .3564      7.244    8.691         8.178       .290      7.163    9.099 
 




Secure Communities Summary Statistics 
 
Variable      Mean    Standard Deviation 
Secure Communities 
 Activated?     .2920     .4547  
 
County population       1,042,393   1,869,944   
Fraction Foreign Born     .1103    .1082 
Fraction Hispanic     .1256    .1509 
Fraction Unauthorized Immigrant   .0492    .0557 
White-Hispanic Dissimilarity     .6893    .1239 
Unemployment Rate      4.3773    1.6944 
Median Household Income     35,332    8,874 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: N =31,467. Observations are annual, county-level data from 2004-2012. Number of counties in sample=3,148. Weighted by population. 





Secure Communities Summary Statistics 
 
Variable      Mean    Standard Deviation 
Secure Communities 
 Activated?     .2920     .4547  
 
      Early Adopter Counties  Late Adopter Counties 
                 (n=17,910)                 (n=10,288) 
      Mean   SD    Mean   SD 
 
County population      1,102,330 2,028,364  888,953  1,372,333 
Fraction Foreign Born    .1119  .1062   .1063   .1131  
Fraction Hispanic    .1418  .1637   .0841   .1002  
Fraction Unauthorized Immigrant  .0540  .0620   .0368   .0311 
White-Hispanic Dissimilarity    .6740   .1236     .7218     .1181 
Unemployment Rate     4.4101     1.7002   4.3202     1.6827 
Median Household Income    35,608    8,858   34,850     8,880 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: N =31,467. Observations are annual, county-level data from 2004-2012. Number of counties in sample=3,148. Weighted by population. 
All demographic data are extracted from Census 2000. Early adoption counties implemented SComm prior to 2011 and late adoption counties 
implemented SComm after 2011 (the mean program implementation year). Observation counts (n) for White-Hispanic dissimilarity and fraction 






Impact of Secure Communities and 287(g) on Rate of Total Index Crime: 
OLS Regression Estimates 
 
Panel A. Difference-in-Difference Estimates 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
          Specification of Dependent Variable 
        Log Levels                     Log Levels  
Explanatory Variable               (1)       (2)           
 
Regression Specification A 
 
 Secure Communities Activated   -.0324*    -.0277 
        (.0177)    (.0188) 
 
 287(g) Activated      .0492*    .0671** 
       (.0271)    (.0314) 
 
Program Interaction Variable        -.0467 
           (.0303) 
Regression Specification B 
 
For sample of 287(g) Applied Counties 
(n=1,002) 
   
 Secure Communities Activated   -.0223    .0376 
        (.0469)    (.0795) 
 
 287(g) Activated      .0024    .0364 
       (.0466)    (.0322) 
 
Program Interaction Variable        -.1223 
           (.0808) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________
County Fixed Effects      Y    Y 
Year Fixed Effects      Y    Y 
Program Interaction Variable     N    Y 
Notes: **p<0.05, *p<0.1. The dependent variable is the log of annual index crime rate. The table reports regression coefficients, with standard errors in 
















Impact of Secure Communities and 287(g) on Crime Rate by Type: 
OLS Regression Estimates 
 
Panel B. Violent and Property Offenses – Log Levels 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Specification of Dependent Variable 
      Violent Crime                 Property Crime   
Explanatory Variable              (1)  (2)     (3)  (4)          
 
Regression Specification A 
 
Secure Communities Activated  -.0488  -.0363  -.0306*  -.0268 
(.0328)  (.0351)  (.0176)  (.0186) 
 
287(g) Activated     .0840** .1320***  .0462  .0606* 
(.0316)  (.0404)  (.0275)  (.0314) 
 
Program Interaction Variable       -.1253***   -.0380 
(.0458)    (.0304) 
Regression Specification B 
For sample of 287(g) Applied Counties 
(n=1,002) 
 
Secure Communities Activated  -.1000  -.0376  -.0140  .0449 
(.0629)  (.0974)  (.0460)  (.0781) 
 
287(g) Activated     .0374  .0728  -.0008  .0326 
(.0542)  (.0460)  (.0466)  (.0320) 
 
Program Interaction Variable       -.1273    -.1202 
(.0896)    (.0802) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
County Fixed Effects        Y     Y      Y      Y  
Year Fixed Effects        Y     Y      Y      Y 
Program Interaction Variable       N     Y      N      Y 
Notes: ***p<0.001, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. The dependent variable is the log of annual crime rate. The table reports regression coefficients, with standard 




















Impact of Secure Communities and 287(g) on Rate of Total Index Crime: 




 Specification of Dependent Variable 
Log Levels                     Log Levels  
Explanatory Variable               (1)       (2)           
 
For Counties Below Median of Fraction Pop. Unauthorized Immigrant  
(n= 28,333) 
 
Secure Communities     -.0354*    -.0360* 
(.0181)    (.0182) 
 
287(g)       .0958*    .0892* 
(.0481)    (.0512) 
 
Program Interaction Variable        .0222 
(.0314) 
For Counties Above Median of Fraction Pop. Unauthorized Immigrant  
(n= 28,333) 
 
Secure Communities     -.0237    .0169   
(.0216)    (.0233) 
 
287(g)       .0239    .0405 
(.0326)    (.0336) 
 
Program Interaction Variable        -.0428 
(.0318) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
County Fixed Effects      Y         Y 
Year Fixed Effects      Y       Y 
Program Interaction Variable     N       Y 
Notes: *p<0.1. The dependent variable is the log of annual index crime rate. The table reports regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. 





















Impact of Secure Communities and 287(g) on Crime Rates: Program Adoption Time 




     Specification of Dependent Variable 
Index Crime          Violent Crime       Property Crime              
Explanatory Variable            (1)                 (2)     (3)          
 
Early Adopter Counties 
(n= 28,333) 
 
Secure Communities   -.0165   -.0365   -.0134 
(.0183)   (.0334)   (.0192) 
 
287(g)     .0351   .0829***  .0249 
(.0235)   (.0274)   (.0358) 
 
Late Adopter Counties  
(n= 28,333) 
 
Secure Communities   -.0851**  -.0510**  -.0918** 
(.0318)   (.0187)   (.0378) 
 
287(g)     .1360***  .1486*   .1501*** 




County Fixed Effects      Y         Y 
Year Fixed Effects      Y       Y 
Program Interaction Variable     N       N 
Notes: *p<0.1. The dependent variable is the log of annual index crime rate. The table reports regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. 

















Impact of Secure Communities and 287(g) on Specific Offenses 
OLS Regression Estimates 
 
Panel A. Violent Offenses – Log Levels 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                 Specification of Dependent Variable 
 
      Murder    Rape    Robbery   Aggravated Assault 
 Explanatory Variable       (1)      (2)        (3)       (4)    
         
 
Secure Communities  -.0265    -.0293    -.0478    -.0408 
(.0323)    (.0370)    (.0408)    (.0354) 
  
287(g)    .1023    .0593**   .1329***   .0679* 
(.0724)    (.0288)    (.0486)    (.0367) 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
County Fixed Effects        Y       Y             Y        Y  
Year Fixed Effects        Y       Y              Y              Y 
Program Interaction Variable         N                            N               N          N  
Notes: *p<0.1. The dependent variable is the log of annual index crime rate. The table reports regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. N = 31,467. Number of counties = 3,148. Number of 













Impact of Secure Communities and 287(g) on Specific Offenses 
OLS Regression Estimates 
 
Panel B. Property Offenses – Log Levels 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
              Specification of Dependent Variable 
 
      Burglary   Larceny  Motor Vehicle Theft   Arson 
 Explanatory Variable       (1)      (2)        (3)       (4)    
         
 
Secure Communities   -.0288    -.0298*    -.0256    -.0169 
(.0256)    (.0158)    (.0241)    (.0408) 
  
287(g)     .0575*    .0449*    .0740    .1443** 
(.0293)    (.0266)    (.0519)    (.0563) 
  
 
County Fixed Effects        Y       Y             Y        Y  
Year Fixed Effects        Y       Y              Y              Y 
Program Interaction Variable         N                            N               N          N  
Notes: *p<0.1. The dependent variable is the log of annual index crime rate. The table reports regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. N = 31,467. Number of counties = 3,148. Number of 
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